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1. Introduction 
In this paper I try to capture Newton’s notion of unification and the actual practice of unification in his 
scientific work. It is a communis opinio that Newton’s unification of the terrestrial and heavenly bodies 
is an unprecedented achievement. In the literature on the nature and place of unification in scientific 
theories, philosophers of science therefore frequently refer to Newton’s mechanics. Nevertheless, 
few attempts have been made to really assess what Newton wrote/thought on the matter of 
unification in science (Newton’s notion of unification) and whether Newton actually practiced what 
he preached (Newton’s practice of unification).i 
In this paper I will use contemporary approaches on unification as tools of analysis. In the literature 
on unification in philosophy of science there are broadly two positions: the bottom-up approach – 
defended by the causalists – and the top-down approach – defended by the unificationists. 
According to the first approach explanation is local; according to the second it is global. The 
causalists claim that unification is “parasitic on the causal explanation of individual facts” (Kitcher, 1985: 
636). This approach was epitomised by Wesley Salmon (Salmon, 1984).ii The unificationists, on the 
other hand, endorse the view that causal explanation of particular occurrences recapitulates the 
ordering derived from the systematisation of regularities (Kitcher, 1985: 635). This tradition is 
primarily embodied by Philip Kitcher (e.g. 1989). Recently Gerhard Schurz (1999) defended a rather 
different top-down approach. 
First, I will argue that Kitcher’s account of unification does not provide an adequate perspective on 
Newton’s practice of unification (section 2). I will omit a comparison between Newton’s notion of 
unification and Kitcher’s account. The reason for this is that there are few statements in Newton’s 
work that explicitly converge to or differ from Kitcher’s account. Second, I will argue that Schurz’ 
account is at odds with Newton’s notion and practice of unification (section 3). Finally, I will argue 
that Salmon’s later synthesis of the two approaches (1998) is a good starting point for describing and 
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understanding Newton’s notion and practice of unification (section 4). In this section I attempt to 
characterise Newton’s notion and practice of unification. To sum up, in this paper I will deal with 
different but obviously interconnected questions. Did Newton conceive unification according to one 
of our contemporary approaches? Did he realize unification according to one of our contemporary 
approaches? Is the end product unified in the sense of one of our contemporary theories? What are 
the essential differences and/or similarities between Newton’s conception and practice of 
unification and ours? 
 
2. Kitcher and Newton 
 
2.1. Kitcher’s Views on Unification 
Kitcher claims that behind the official view of the logical positivists, which states that explanation 
aims at expectability, there is also an unofficial view which regards explanation essentially as 
unification (Kitcher, 1981: 508). Kitcher tries to develop this idea. Our understanding of nature 
advances by increasing the degree of unification: 
 
Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many phenomena, 
using the same patterns of derivation again and again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the 
number of types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute). (Kitcher, 1989, p. 432) 
 
Understanding amounts to seeing common (argument) patterns. Let us take a closer look (I will 
simplify, however). According to Kitcher a theory unifies our beliefs when it provides one (or a few) 
pattern(s) of argument which can be used in the derivation of a large number of sentences we accept 
(Ibid.: 514). He introduces K, the set of accepted sentences at a certain point in history; E(K) is the 
explanatory store, i.e. the set of arguments acceptable as the basis for acts of explanation by those 
whose beliefs are exactly the members of K (Ibid.: 512). In Kitcher’s understanding E(K) is the set of 
arguments that best unifies K (Kitcher: 1989, p. 434). How do we obtain E(K)? In order to 
understand this we need the notion of a ‘generating set’. A generating set (G) for a set of derivations (D) is a 
set of argument patterns such that each argument/derivation in the set D is an instantiation of some 
pattern in G (Ibid.: 519-520). A generating set G is said to be complete with respect to K if and only if 
every derivation that is acceptable relative to K and which instantiates a pattern in G belongs to D.iii 
In order to determine E(K) we restrict ourselves to those generating sets that are complete with 
respect to K. Then we look for several possible bases among the set of complete generating sets. The 
basis for a systematisation is the complete  generating set which is the primus according to three 
criteria: paucity (the amount of argument patterns it contains), stringency (which depends 
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proportionally on of the amount of schematic letters and the level of difficulty for the filling 
instructions to be satisfied) and, finally, the magnitude of the set of conclusions (Ibid., pp. 520-521). 
The quality of a generating set varies proportionally to the stringency and the magnitude of the set 
of conclusions; it varies inversely to its paucity. If we select from the remaining bases the basis with 
the best unifying power we, finally, obtain E(K). What is particularly interesting for my present 
purposes is that Kitcher also links his model to some extent to Newton. He quotes the following 
fragment from the Principia in favour of his account: 
 
If only we could derive the other phenomena of nature from mechanical principles by the same kind of 
reasoning! For many things lead me to have a suspicion that all phenomena may depend on certain forces by 
which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in 
regular figures, or are repelled from one another and recede. (Newton, 1999, p. 382) 
 
From this Kitcher concludes: 
 
This, and other influential passages, inspired Newton’s successors to try to complete the unification of science by 
finding further force laws analogous to the law of universal gravitation. (…) The passage I have quoted from 
Newton suggests the nature of the unification that was being sought. Principia had exhibited how one style of 
argument, one “kind of reasoning from mechanical principles”, could be used in the derivation of descriptions of 
many, diverse, phenomena. The unifying power of Newton’s work consisted in its demonstration that one pattern 
of argument could be used again and again in the derivation of a wide range of accepted sentences. (Kitcher, 
1981: pp. 513-514) 
 
At the level of understanding unification is essential. This quote does not necessarily imply that 
Newton was a proto-unificationist, but it does entail that the Principia revealed or at least suggested 
the importance of using a single argument pattern. According to Kitcher, one of the basic 
Newtonian patterns used in treating one-body-systems with a body α is: 
 
(1) The force on α is β. 
(2) The acceleration of α is γ. 
(3) Force=mass.acceleration.iv 
(4) (Mass α).(γ)= β 
(5) δ=θ v 
(Kitcher, 1981, p. 517) 
 
Therefore Newton’s successors tried to describe a variety of phenomena with the same argument 
pattern in order to understand them.  
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2.2. A Comparison with Newton  
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
As announced in section 1, I will only compare Newton’s practice with Kitcher’s account. This 
amounts to analysing whether Newton’s theory of universal gravitation is unified in the sense that 
Kitcher suggests and whether explanation for Newton is identical to using the same argument 
pattern. I will do so by focussing on examples of explanations in Book III of the Principia, namely 
Newton’s explanation of the tides and his explanation of the motion of the moon (subsection 2.2.2). 
Newton establishes his theory of universal gravitation in Proposition 8 of Book III. In the 
subsequent propositions he explains several phenomena with this theory – such as the tides and the 
motion of the moon. The answer will turn out to be negative: Newton does not seem to accept 
some of the central tenets of Kitcher. Finally, I will argue that there are even further, more 
fundamental differences between Newton and Kitcher with respect to the relationship between 
unification and scientific explanation (subsection 2.2.3).  
 
2.2.2. Newton’s Explanation of the Tides and the Motion of the Moon 
I will analyse Newton’s explanation of the tides and the motion of the moon. The theory of 
universal gravitation predicts that the motions of the moon and the sun will influence the oceans. 
Newton starts by arguing from Corollaries 19-20 to Proposition 66, Book I (this is a three-body-
system) that the sea should rise and fall twice every day (Newton, 1999: 582-3). The force of the sun 
and the moon will cause a mixed motion (Ibid.: 835). In conjunction or opposition their effects will 
be combined, and this will result in the greatest ebb and flood. In the quadratures the sun will raise 
the water while the moon depresses it and will depress the water while the moon arises it. The 
lowest tide of all will arise from the difference between these two effects. Next Newton considers 
the other parameters that are relevant for the phenomenon of the tides: e.g., the distance of the 
moon and the sun from the earth, the declination (or distance from the equator), and the specific 
way the water is transported into a harbour (Ibid.: 836-9). Then Newton turns to the very specific 
case of the harbour in Batsha (then in Indochina, now Vietnam) where the water stays still on the 
day following the transit of the moon over the equator. This can be explained as follows. The tides 
in some harbours are sometimes transported through different channels and pass more quickly 
through some than through others. Then the tides in Batsha are explained as follows:  
 
Let us suppose that two equal tides come from different places to the same harbor and that the first precedes the 
second by a space of six hours after the appulse of the moon to the meridian of the harbor. If the moon is on the 
equator at the time of this appulse to the meridian, then every six hours there will be equal flood tides coming 
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upon corresponding equal ebb tides and causing those tides to be balanced by the flood tides, and thus during the 
course of that day they will cause the water to stay quiet and still. (Ibid.: 838) 
 
Clearly this explanation is ad-hoc: supposed contextual factors are adduced. Halonen & Hintikka 
would speak of “ad explanandum truths” (1999: 27). These auxiliary premises obviously vary from case 
to case, i.e. from harbour to harbour. They cannot be the source of any unification: each explanation 
involves different contextual factors. Newton does not use a standard argument pattern here to 
explain. Rather he first infers the causal mechanisms that are responsible for the tides from the 
theory of universal gravitation and next he considers relevant parameters that influence or disturb 
the regular tides. Newton is not explaining here along Kitcher’s line of thought. 
 
Let us turn to Newton’s explanation of the motions of the moon. I will focus on Propositions 22 
and 25, Book III here, since a full account of the explanation of the motions of the moon would be 
too technical and complex to spell out here. From the theory of universal gravitation it follows that 
the motions of the earth and the sun will affect the motion of the moon. In Proposition 66, Book I 
Newton constructed a three-body-system including the relevant forces. The first accelerative force is 
the force that arises from the mutual attraction between the earth and the moon. By this force alone 
the moon would describe areas proportional to the times (Ibid.: 571). Then Newton introduces the 
accelerative force of the sun that he resolves into two components: one parallel to the force between 
the earth and the moon, the other directed from the sun to the earth. Since the first component 
force is not inversely proportional to the square of the distance it will disturb the moon’s regular 
motion produced by the first force (Ibid.). The second component force in combination with the 
two previous forces will result in a force that is no longer directed from the sun to the moon and 
will cause a deviation from the elliptical orbit and Kepler’s second law. This explains why the moon 
shows irregular motions. Newton declares in the subsequent scholium that he wished “to show by these 
computations of the lunar motions that the lunar motions can be computed from their causes by the theory of gravity” 
(Ibid.: 869). Indeed, what truly explains the motions of the moon is the interaction between the 
accelerative forces of the earth and the sun on the moon. Of course, Newton’s second law or his 
formula of universal gravitation will enable you to obtain the direction and strength of these forces, 
but these formulae remain silent on the interaction between them. It is not an argument pattern that 
provides explanation here, but the reference to (the interaction of) several centripetal forces, i.e. 
causes. 
 
In the case of the tides Newton infers from the three-body-system that the sun and the moon will 
cause a mixed motion and that the sea should rise and fall twice every day. But to explain the tides at 
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specific places involves knowledge of other factors: e.g., the latitude of that place or the way the 
water is transported into a harbour. This involves the postulation ad-hoc causes (cf. the harbour of 
Batsha). For every place these factors are different and hence there is no single argument pattern for 
all of them. In the case of the motion of the moon Newton infers from his three-body-system that 
the accelerative force of the sun will disturb the strict Keplerian motion of the moon. Newton 
assumes the forces postulated by the theory of universal gravitation (the force of the earth and the 
disturbing force of the sun) and shows that an irregular motion will follow from them. The causes 
inferred from the theory of universal gravitation explain here, not some standard argument pattern. 
To sum up: Newton’s practice does not correspond to Kitcher’s account.  
 
2.2.3. Some Further Fundamental Differences 
There are further substantial differences between Kitcher and Newton. To see these we must take a 
closer look at Newton’s actual unification. Let me point out that this section can be considered as a 
stage setting for section 4, where I characterise Newton’s notion and practice of unification. The 
unification is not straightforward. Let us briefly look at how Newton establishes his famous 
unification. Firstly, Newton demonstrates that the circumjovial planets, the circumsaturnian planets, 
the primary planets and the moonvi are (1) drawn towards their respective centres by a centripetal 
force, and, that (2) this centripetal force varies inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
from those centers (Newton, 1999, p. 802-5). This respectively follows from the fact that (1’) they 
describe areas proportional to the times and (2’) that their periodic times are as 3/2 powers of their 
distances from their respective centre. Newton infers the causal agents that are responsible for the 
mathematical regularities. These ‘deductions’ are validated by propositions Newton proved earlier in 
Book I: 
 
Proposition 2: 
Every body that moves in some curved line described in a plane and, by a radius drawn to a point, either 
unmoving or moving uniformly forward with a rectilinear motion, describes areas around that point proportional 
to the times, is urged by a centripetal force tending toward that same point. (Ibid., p. 446) 
 
Corollary 6, Proposition 4: 
If the periodic times are as 3/2 powers of the radii, and therefore the velocities are inversely as the square roots 
of the radii, the centripetal forces will be inversely as the squares of the radii; and conversely. (Ibid., p. 451) 
 
A first level of unification is reached in Proposition 5. We know that the primary planets are drawn 
towards the sun by an inverse square law, that the moon is drawn to the earth by a similar force, and 
that the secondary planets are drawn to their primary planets by a similar force. These are 
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explanatory claims. Since these revolutions are phenomena of the same kind, they must – according 
to rule 2vii – “depend on causes of the same kind” (Ibid., p. 806). The elements of its domain obviously 
are: the primary planets, the secondary planets and the moon.viii I will represent this as follows: 
 
(1) (F ~1/r²) for domain D1 (D1=[p=primary planets, s=secondary planets, m=moon]) 
The force-function operates from p towards the sun, from s towards Jupiter and Saturn, and from m to the earth. 
 
In Corollary 1 Newton applies the third law of motion. He establishes that the sun is drawn back by 
the primary planets, that the earth is drawn back by the moon, and that Jupiter and Saturn are drawn 
back by their satellites. (1) is reinterpreted as follows: 
 
(2) (F ~1/r²) for domain D2 (D2=[p=primary planets, s=secondary planets, m=moon, S=sun]) 
The force-function operates from p towards S (and conversely), from s towards Jupiter and Saturn (and conversely), and from m to the 
earth (and conversely). 
 
Corollary 2 to Proposition 5 states that the gravity towards every planet is inversely as the square of 
the distance (Ibid., p. 805). Thus, what is important for my present purposes here, is that Newton at 
this stage proves that the inverse square law is valid for all planets. In Corollary 3 he further extends 
his claim: all planets are heavy toward one another. And hence Jupiter and Saturn when in 
conjunction sensibly perturb each other’s motion by attracting each other, the sun perturbs the lunar 
motions, and the sun and the moon perturb the sea (Ibid., p. 806). (2) is again reinterpreted as 
follows: 
 
(3) (F ~1/r²) for domain D2 
The force-function operates from p towards S (and conversely), from s towards p (and conversely), from m to e (and conversely), and 
from every p to every p. 
 
Next, he reinterprets Galileo’s law of free fall in the following way (Ibid., p. 806-7).ix The falling of 
heavy bodies takes place in equal times. Newton used experiments with pendulums to show that 
different materials of exactly the same weight (gold, silver, lead, glass, sand, salt, wood, water, and 
wheat) swing back and forth with equal oscillations. These experiments make it possible to discern 
the equality of the times with higher precision. The motive force of a falling body is its weight. This 
force is proportional to the acceleration and the mass of the body (by Newton’s second law). Since 
the acceleration for bodies in free fall is constant, the weight of bodies in free fall is proportional to 
their mass. Newton generalizes the outcome of the experiments with pendulums to all terrestrial 
bodies. In this way Newton arrives at a different unification: 
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(4) (W ~ m) for domain D3 (D3=[t=terrestrial bodies]) 
 
Since “there is no doubt that that the nature of gravity toward the planet is the same as toward the earth”, this also 
holds for the other planets (Ibid., p. 807). As he writes: 
 
Further, since the satellites of Jupiter revolve in times that are the 3/2 powers of their distances from the center 
of Jupiter, their accelerative gravities toward Jupiter will be inversely as the squares of the distances from the 
center of Jupiterx, and, therefore, at equal distances from Jupiter, their accelerative gravities would come out 
equal.. Accordingly, in equal times in falling from equal heights [toward Jupiter] they would describe equal spaces, 
just as happens with heavy bodies on this earth of ours. (Ibid.)  
 
Here Newton has extended the domain of the (4). Consequently a new unification arises: 
 
(5) (W ~ m) for domain D4 (D4=[t=terrestrial bodies, bp=bodies in the neighbourhood of other primary planets]) 
The force-function operates from t to the earth and more generally from bp to p. 
 
In Proposition 7 Newton claims that gravity exists in all bodies universally and is proportional to the 
quantity of matter in each (Ibid., p. 810). This follows from the fact that all parts of any planets A 
are heavy toward any planet B, and since the gravity of each part is to the gravity of the whole as the 
matter of that part to the matter of the whole, and since to every action there is always an equal 
reaction, it follows that planet B will gravitate in turn to all the parts of planet A, and its gravity will 
toward any part will be to its gravity towards the whole of the planet as the matter of that part to the 
matter of that whole (Ibid., pp. 810-11). So we get: 
 
 (6) (W ~ m) for domain D5 (D5=[b=all bodies universally]) 
 
Finally, he generalizes the inverse square law for all bodies universally (Ibid., p. 811). He firstly 
argues that the force of the whole is the resultant of the forces of the constituting parts. Next, he 
shows that the gravitation toward each individual part is inversely as the square of the distance, 
which follows directly from Proposition 74, Book I (Ibid., p. 593, p. 811). By composition – 
componendo – of forces, the sum of the attractions will come out in the same ratio. Hence, all parts 
gravitate toward each other and this force varies inversely as the square of the distance from their 
centres.  
 
(7) (F ~1/r²) for domain D5. 
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So what he does is basically this: he extends the proportionality of weight and mass valid for bodies 
in free fall to celestial bodies, and subsequently he extends the inverse square law for celestial bodies 
to all bodies universally. The final result is the law of universal gravitation. The extension from one 
domain to another is an essential feature of Newton’s unification in Book III. Newton already 
offered causal explanations before he established his theory. Kitcher’s account does not incorporate 
the dynamics described above, since he assumes that generating sets are deductively closed. If a 
generating set is deductively closed, or ‘complete’ as Kitcher calls it, this necessarily means that the 
domain must remain fixed, since the initial tenet is that every derivation acceptable relative to K 
must already belong to the set of generated derivations. Newton, however, extends the formulae 
‘W~m’ and ‘F~1/r²’, respectively, to the celestial bodies and the terrestrial bodies. The 
corresponding generating sets are incomplete with respect to K. When Newton applies a generating 
set (including: (1) a=constant, (2) W=F and (3) F=m.a) in order to derive W ~ m, he uses the 
domain of terrestrial bodies. If, however, we extend our knowledge – in this case the observation 
that the satellites of Jupiter are equally urged – and combine this with some creative thought, we can 
derive the same formula for celestial bodies by a similar pattern. The result is that K as well as its 
consequences is extended. It may very well turn out that certain formulae can be applied to different 
domains which we beforehand neglected. Solely extending our knowledge is not enough to apply a 
pattern to a new domain. Due to this, he portrays our knowledge and inferences from it as far more 
static than they really are. Unification in this example is not generated by choosing from a set of 
complete generating patterns and bases and applying them to an invariable domain. It is established 
rather by extending our knowledge, and – via creative thought – applying it to new contexts and 
domains. It took someone of Newton’s calibre to do so. A similar thing can be said for the 
derivation of F ~ 1/r². Kitcher’s problem seems to be that he focuses too much on the result and 
not on the context of discovery. I guess that Kitcher would reply that he is not talking about the 
unificatory act but about the understanding provided by an accomplished theory. I agree that this is 
what Kitcher talks about. But what is more crucial: Kitcher claims that at the level of scientific 
understanding unification is essential. It seems to me that a lot of understanding is provided in the 
way Newton unifies, i.e. unifying by identification of causal agents. I think that Newton would have 
agreed here. This understanding is provided by Newton’s bottom-up approach. When Newton 
infers instances of centripetal forces and uses the second regula philosophandi to identify them, he 
generates a first level of unification: the same inverse-square force pulls the primary planets towards 
the sun, the secondary to the moon, and the moon towards the earth. These causal explanations help 
to understand step (1). If we look somewhat further in Newton’s deduction a similar thing happens. 
The motive force of a falling body is its weight. According the second law of motion this force is 
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jointly proportional to the acceleration and its mass. Since the acceleration is constant weight is 
proportional to its mass. We further know that gravity extends to the moon (cf. the moon test), and 
that the same inverse-square force acts on the primary and secondary planets and the moon. Here 
Newton again uses his second rule: the nature of gravity toward the planets is the same as toward 
the earth. Therefore we can apply the proportionality of weight and mass to bodies near the planets 
as well. The identification of causal agents again explains step (5). That all parts of a planet gravitate 
to another planet explains step (6). The composition of forces in Proposition 74 explains why all 
parts gravitate toward each other and that the relevant force is an inverse-square law (step (7)). My 
feeling is that the dynamics Kitcher neglects really is important to Newton. So Newton and Kitcher 
seem to disagree on this point. The road Newton uses to arrive at universal gravitation enlightens, 
the result to a lesser extent. 
 
3. Schurz and Newton 
 
3.1. Schurz’ Ideas on Unification 
In my presentation of Schurz’ ideas I will mainly focus on two propositions concerning unification 
and explanation which Schurz argues for and which can be considered as the core of his view. The 
four elements of an explanation, according to Schurz, are: 
(i) the why-question (“Why P?”),  
(ii) the cognitive state C of the questioner, 
(iii) the answer A, and finally,  
(iv) the expanded or revised cognitive state C+A after receiving the answer. 
Schurz further proposes a necessary condition (U) for explanation. This condition is: 
 
(U): 
The explanatory premises Prem must be less in need of explanation (in C+A) than the explanandum P (in C). (Ibid.: 
97) 
 
Schurz gives the following example (I have made some minor adjustments). Suppose Peter is flying 
past the window in the third floor. When someone would declare that Peter is flying past the 
window in the third floor because one second ago he was flying past the window in the fifth floor, 
few of us would agree that this is an adequate explanation. A good explanation could be that Peter is 
falling because of the gravity of the earth. This illustrates, according to Schurz, that in all 
explanations the premises should be unproblematic, i.e. they are less in need of explanation than the 
explanandum. One cannot understand something by means of some other thing which on has not 
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understood (Ibid.: 98). If a phenomenon P is assimilated in the premises in C+A, then the de-
coherence of P in C is removed (in C+A) but at the same time new information units may itself 
produce new de-coherence with respect to other parts of C+A (Ibid.). Condition (U) warrants that 
the loss of coherence due to the addition of the premises to C must be smaller than the gain of 
coherence due to the assimilation of P to the premises C+A. In order to establish a proper 
explanation one needs to refer to coherent or unified premises from which P can be derived. This 
leads to a top-down approach. Unification is decisive and fundamental; causal explanation is derived 
from it. Hence causality is not an a priori notion, but is it theory-relative. Causal explanation is a by-
product of unification at the level of theories or laws (Ibid.: 100). Once a theory unifies phenomena 
originating from two or more different domains, the next step will be to causally structure that 
domain by means of a Causality Theory (CT). As Schurz writes:  
 
only because these theoretical laws have this overall unification power, our belief in real causal processes as 
opposed to non-causal correlations is rationally justified. (…) it is a result of the search for unification at the 
theoretical level that we introduce the distinction between reasons of being and reasons of believing at the 
singular event level. (Schurz, 1999: 101). 
 
Each set of fundamental laws is, as mentioned above, accompanied by such a CT. A CT is a group 
of highest-level theories that puts constraints on the way real events may influence each other and 
consists of: 
 
(CT): 
(1) principles which concern the decomposition of macrophysical objects into smaller parts, and,  
(2) principles describing the propagation of ‘causal’ forces, of fields, momentum and/or of energy, in space and 
time. (Ibid.) 
 
3.2. A Comparison with Newton 
In this subsection I will look at Newton’s practice as well as his notion of unification. I will treat 
them together since they are closely related. Are Schurz and Newton kindred soul with respect to 
unification and explanation? I think not. The reason is that Newton at a crucial moment violates 
Schurz’ necessary condition for explanation (U). At the end of the second edition of the Prinipia 
(1713) Newton claims to have explained the motions of the heavenly bodies and the flux and reflux 
of the sea. The cause of these phenomena is the force of gravity. However Newton did not assign a 
cause to gravity – hence he did not explain the explanans and he did not provide a causality theory.  
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Let us take a look at the Scholium Generale of that second edition – hereby we are already exploring 
Newton’s notion of unification: 
 
Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of gravity, but I have not 
yet assigned a cause to gravity. (…) And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to certain laws 
that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies. (Newton, 1999: 943; my 
emphasis) 
 
So Newton accepted an explanans – the force of gravity – that was in equal (or perhaps in more) 
need of explanation as the explanandum – the heavenly motions and the tides. Obviously no 
causality theory was provided: Newton did not specify a physical modus operandi for the force of 
gravity in his scientific practice. Newton explicitly warned his readers: 
 
Moreover, I use interchangeable and indiscriminately words signifying attraction, impulse, or any sort of 
propensity toward a center, considering these forces not from a physical but only from a mathematical point of 
view. Therefore let the reader beware of thinking that by words of this kind I am anywhere defining a species or 
mode of action of a physical cause or reason, or that I am attributing forces in a true and physical sense to centers 
(which are mathematical points) if I happen to say that centers attract or that centers have forces. (Newton, 1999: 
408; also see Ibid.: 588). 
 
As is well known Leibniz and Huygens regarded gravity as a qualitas occulta.xi Target of their criticism 
was the fact that gravity was used in explanations, while nothing was said about the nature and 
further functioning of gravity itself. Newton replied to their criticism with the following analogy – 
and here we are entering Newton’s notion of explanation/unification: 
 
And to understand this without knowing the cause of gravity, is as good a progress in philosophy as to 
understand the frame of a clock & the dependence of ye wheels upon one another without knowing the cause of 
the gravity of the weight wch moves the machine is in the philosophy of clockwork, or the understanding the 
frame of the bones & muscles by the contracting or dilating of the muscles without knowing how the muscles are 
contracted or dilated by the power of ye mind is [in] the philosophy of animal motion. (Thurnbull, 1978, Vol. V: 
300). 
 
The point Newton wants to make is that it is very well possible that certain phenomena are 
explained by an explanans, whose further cause is unclear. But there is no reason not to consider it 
as a proper explanation. He has explained the motion of celestial and terrestrial bodies. It works, satis 
est. One might add one thing here. When we look at Newton’s unification as described in the 
previous section, it turns out that (causal) explanation is not a by-product of unification. Newton for 
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instance already provided explanations – centripetal forces varying inversely as the square of the 
distance cause Kepler’s second and third law – in order to establish (1).  
 
4. Newton’s Views Positively Described 
In order to get a grasp on Newton’s notion and practice of unification I will focus on the analytic 
and the synthetic moment in Book III, the systema mundi, of the Principia. As Newton put it, the basic 
difficulty of natural philosophy is “to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to 
demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces” (Newton, 1999: 382). The first conjunct refers to 
analysis, the second to synthesis. The analysis in the Principia consists in deriving “from celestial 
phenomena the gravitational forces by which bodies tend toward the sun and the individual planets”, the synthesis 
consists in the deduction of “the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea” from these forces 
(Ibid.). We will firstly consider the analysis. The analysis consists in: 
 
making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and 
admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain 
Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from 
Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way 
of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how 
much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phænomena, the Conclusion may be 
pronounced generally. But at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin 
to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to 
Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and 
from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. (Newton, 1979: 404) 
 
Newton testifies here that pillar of scientific enterprise are observations and experiments – apart 
from “other certain Truths”. From these general conclusions are drawn by induction. The more general 
a conclusion the stronger. In the analysis in the Principia Newton infers from the observation that 
Kepler’s second and third law hold for the primary and secondary planets that these motions are 
caused by inverse-square centripetal forces. The analytic phase of science typically consists in 
inferring causal agents. This is carried out from Propositions 1 to 5. In Proposition 5 Newton 
concludes that since these phenomena are of the same kind they depend on causes of the same kind 
(Ibid.: 806). This is where unification comes in: by identifying causal mechanisms. But the method of 
analysis doesn’t stop here. The following step consists in generalising the results of the experiments 
and observations – as Newton puts it: “drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction” (Newton, 
1979: 404). This again involves unification. Since Newton has demonstrated that the nature of 
gravity is the same for the primary and the secondary planets, we can use experiments here on earth 
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to gather further information concerning this force of gravity. In Proposition 6 Newton uses 
pendulum experiments to show that weight of a body is proportional to its mass. From this he 
concludes that this proportionality also applies to other planets and their satellites. Underlying these 
inductive steps is a deep belief in the contiguity of nature. This is expressed in the third regula 
philosophandi: 
 
Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended or remitted [i.e., qualities that cannot be increased and diminished] and 
that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally. 
(Ibid.: 795) 
 
In Proposition 7 he extends the same proportionality to all bodies universally. Finally, in Proposition 
8 he extends the inverse proportionality between gravity and the square of the distance to all bodies 
universally. That gravity exits in all bodies universally and is proportional to their mass and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance from their centres is a proposition rendered general by 
induction. In the following phase of synthesis it is investigated whether phenomena that were not 
included in the original selection on which the general conclusion was based confirm to this 
proposition or whether exceptions occur: 
 
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either 
exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such 
propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (Ibid.: 796)  
 
 The method of synthesis consist in: 
 
assuming the Causes discover’d and establich’d as Principles, and by them explaining the phaenomena proceeding 
from them, and proving the Explanations. (Newton, 1979: 405) 
 
The synthesis starts after Proposition 8 and stretches out to the very end of Book III. Newton there 
shows that the motion of the planets, the motion of the moon, the tides, the motion of comets can 
be deduced from the causes proposed by the theory of universal gravitation. The phase of synthesis 
concerns the testing of the generality of the general principles. If no problems occur, the principle 
can by stated as truly universal – which is the case in the Principia. If problems occur then the 
principle needs to be “de-unified”. Ultimately, the synthesis consists in testing the general principles 
obtained in the analysis. 
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We can now see – from Newton’s utterances and his actual practice – that the role of unification is 
mainly connected with the analytic phase. We start with singular causal explanations. When these 
phenomena are sufficiently similar we can infer that they are produced by causes of the same kind. 
This is where unification comes in: when we identify causal mechanisms, we unify. This type of 
unification I refer to as unification1. Given the fact that nature is very consonant with herself and has 
a preference for the same mode of operation, it is very likely that we will encounter similar causal 
agents when we study nature. Then a further level of unification is reached: qualities that cannot be 
diminished nor increased that pertain to all bodies on which we can perform experiments can be 
taken as universal qualities. This inductive generalisation is based on a selected set of phenomena 
(Ibid.: 386). This type of unification I refer to as unification2. Since Halonen & Hintikka only focus on 
the “inductio”-side of unification they miss out on the first type of unification (Halonen & Hintikka, 
1999: 38-40). But there are further problems for their interpretation. The first phase of scientific 
inquiry according to Newton is the analysis where we proceed from the phenomena to (singular) 
causes. The motions of the secondary planets e.g. are explained by centripetal forces. It is clear from 
this that explanation is part of theory formation. This is a problem for the account of Halonen & 
Hintikka: they claim that for Newton explanation only involves “synthetic” derivations of an already 
established theory and is not part of the “analytic” process of theory formation (Halonen & 
Hintikka, 1999: 40). 
 
Neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’ proposal are adequate descriptions of Newtons views on unification 
and scientific explanation. I think that a start for a better (contemporary) description of Newton’s 
view can be found in the later work of Wesley Salmon. Salmon moved to the position that there are 
at least two intellectual benefits that scientific theories can offer us, (1) a unified world picture and 
insight how various phenomena belong to the same domain, and (2) knowledge of the underlying 
mechanisms. These two account are by no means incompatible, both are interconnectedxii:  
 
In the process of searching out the hidden mechanisms of nature, we often find that superficially diverse 
phenomena are produced by the same basic mechanisms. To the extent that we find extremely pervasive basic mechanism, 
we are also revealing the unifying principles of nature. (Salmon, 1998, p. 90; my emphasis) 
 
This seems more apt to apply to Newton’s views and practice. More precisely, it agrees with what I 
have called unification1: unification established through identification of causal agents. Newton started 
Book III by inferring several inverse-square law centripetal forces. Since the constellations in which 
these forces are discovered are similar, we are allowed to infer – by the second rule for natural 
philosophy – that these phenomena are produced by one and the same cause. In this case Newton 
 15
establishes a first level of unification by identifying causal agents – centripetal forces. This agrees 
very well with Salmon who claims we will often find that diverse phenomena are produced by the 
same basic mechanisms since the set of causal agents is fairly restricted. When we realise this we 
automatically unify. This is because a limited set of causal mechanisms pervades the physical world: 
 
Since there seem to be a small number of fundamental causal mechanisms, and some extremely comprehensive 
laws that govern them, the ontic conception has as much right as the epistemic conception to take the natural 
phenomena as a basic aspect of our comprehension of the world. The unity lies in the pervasiveness of the underlying 
mechanisms upon which we depend for explanation. (Salmon, 1984: 276) 
 
Newton agreed to this.xiii Nature after all is “simple, and is normally self-consistent throughout an immense 
variety of effects, by maintaining the same mode of operation” (Thurnbull, 1975-1978, II: 418). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Neither Kitcher’s not Schurz’ account seem to shed light on Newton’s notion and practice of 
unification. Of all modern alternatives Salmon’s later work on unification and causal explanation 
seems to be the closest to Newton’s way of conceptualising and performing unification. There are 
two notions of unification in Newton’s work that succeed each other: 
(1) unification1 refers to unification which is established though identification of causal 
mechanisms (this is based on the premise that nature maintains the same modus operandi as 
much as possible) 
(2) unification2 refers to generalising a conclusion to phenomena that were not originally included 
in the set of data used to establish this conclusion (this is based on the premise that nature is 
contiguous) 
The first type is highly similar to Salmon’s later thought on the non-incompatibility between an 
unificationist and a causalist approach of explanation. It should be also clear by now that Newton’s 
way of conceiving unification and his actual practice correspond. He practiced what he preached. 
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i The only exception seems to be Halonen & Hintikka, 1999. I will briefly show why their account is not satisfactory in 
section 4.  
ii In his later work Salmon abandoned this idea and argued that both approaches were not incompatible. See infra. 
iii This is equivalent to saying that the generating patterns must be deductively closed, i.e. everything that is derivable 
from it, is a member of it. Thus, a set Γ is deductively closed if and only if for every A the following holds: A is a 
member of the set Γ, if A is derivable from Γ. 
iv Note that Newton’s original second law states: ‘A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and 
takes place along the straight line in which the force is impressed.’ (Newton, 1999, p. 416). 
v “δ” refers to the variable coordinates of the body; “θ” is an explicit function of time. 
vi The proof for the moon is different. This concerns the famous moon test. In Proposition 4 Newton shows (1) that 
terrestrial gravity extends to the moon and that it does so by an inverse square law, and (2) it is this force of gravity 
which causes the moon to circle about the earth. Newton calculates the distance the moon would fall if deprived from all 
forward motion in one minute. The result of that calculation is 15 1/12 Paris feet. If gravity diminishes by an inverse 
square law and the earth’s gravity extends to the moon, then it follows that a heavy body on the earth’s surface should 
fall freely in one minute through 60 times 60 the above 15 1/12 Paris feet (the moon is approximately positioned at 60 
earth-radii from the earth’s centre) (Cohen, 1999, p. 205). This indeed agrees with terrestrial experiments (cf. Huygens’ 
experiments wit pendula). 
vii Rule 2 goes as follows: ‘Therefore, the causes assigned to the natural effects of the same kind must be, so far as 
possible, the same.’ (Newton, 1999, p. 795) 
viii The domain refers to those bodies that are drawn toward a centre. Therefore at this stage the sun is not an element of 
the domain. I will also take over Newton’s distinction between the secondary planets and the moon. 
ix Newton does not mention Galileo’s name here: ‘Others have long since observed that the falling bodies of all heavy 
bodies toward the earth (at least making an adjustment for the inequality of the retardation that arises from the very 
slight resistance of the air) takes place in equal times, and it is possible to discern that equality of the times, to a very high 
degree of accuracy, by using pendulums.’ (Newton, 1999, p. 806-7) 
x In modern terminology this can be demonstrated as follows. Huygens published the result that a body travelling in a 
circle needs a force proportional to v²/r to keep it in orbit: F= k.v²/r. Since v equals 2.π.r/t: F=k.4.π².r²/t².r. Multiplied 
by r/r: F= k.4.π².r³/t²r². Since r³/t² is a constant according to Kepler’s third law, we can write: F= (constant)/r². See 
Newton, 1999, p. 451. 
xi Larry Laudan sees gravitation as an external conceptual problem, i.e. a case ‘where a scientific theory is in conflict with 
any component of the prevalent world view’. (Laudan, 1977: 61-62). Lakatos states that in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries people were accustomed to approach a theory primarily with metaphysical criticism. Therefore, they essentially 
criticised Newton for the ‘unintelligibility’ of his theory and did not care whether it was valid or not on Newton’s 
proposed criteria (Lakatos, 1978: 213). In the mechanistic metaphysics the only interaction between entities was by direct 
contact. 
xii Also see his Salmon, 1989: pp. 183-4. I focus here on his fourth essay entitled Scientific Explanation: Causation and 
Unification (pp. 68-78) in Salmon, 1998. 
xiii Newton’s motivation for this view is primarily theological. This is clear from the following statement: ‘Truth is ever to 
be found in simplicity, and not in the multiplicity and confusion of things. As the world, which to the naked eye exhibits 
the greatest variety of objects, appears very simple in its internal constitution when surveyed by a philosophical 
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understanding, and so much the simpler by now much the better understood, so it is in these [prophetic] visions. It is the 
perfection of God’s work that they are all done with the greatest simplicity. He is the god of order and not of confusion. 
And therefore as they that would understand the frame of the world must indeavour to reduce their knowledge to all 
possible simplicity, so must it be in seeking to understand these visions.’ (Quoted from Manuel, 1974, pp. 48-9) 
 
